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Rear Admiral Rempt is a 1966 graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy. Initial assignments included deploy-
ments to Vietnam aboard USS Coontz (DLG 9) and
USS Somers (DDG 34). He later commanded USS An-
telope (PG 86), USS Callaghan (DDG 994), and USS
Bunker Hill (CG 52).
Among his shore assignments were the Naval Sea Sys-
tems Command as the initial project officer for the
Mark 41 Vertical Launch System; Chief of Naval Oper-
ations (CNO) staff as the Aegis Weapon System pro-
gram coordinator; director of the Prospective
Commanding Officer/Executive Officer department,
Surface Warfare Officers Schools Command; and Di-
rector, Anti-Air Warfare Requirements Division
(OP-75) on the CNO’s staff. Rear Admiral Rempt also
served in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,
where he initiated development of Naval Theater Bal-
listic Missile Defense, continuing those efforts as Direc-
tor, Theater Air Defense on the CNO’s staff. More
recently, he was Program Executive Officer, Theater Air
Defense, the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Theater Combat Systems, the first Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations for Missile Defense, and Director,
Surface Warfare (N76), on the CNO’s staff. Rear Ad-
miral Rempt assumed duties as the forty-eighth Presi-
dent of the Naval War College on 22 August 2001.
He holds master’s degrees in systems analysis from
Stanford University and in national security and strate-
gic studies from the Naval War College.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
Today, our purpose is to eliminate terrorists of global reach and
to deter their state sponsors. But we need effective strategies that
will allow us to find and destroy such organizations, stop other
states from harboring them, and encourage allied governments
to support our essential and common interests. It is no easy task.
AS WE READ THE DAILY HEADLINES and follow the ongoing action to
see the progress we have made in the Terror War, we may find it useful to com-
pare this war with those in our immediate past. The lessons of history, applied to
today’s situation, best help us understand the nature of the war in which we are
engaged. In particular, they suggest which policy objectives can be achieved by
military force, and which cannot.
The Vietnam War was difficult militarily, and it deeply divided our nation po-
litically and socially. DESERT STORM, by contrast, was a post–Cold War rallying
point. The armed forces enjoyed widespread public support, and the American
people were quite unified during that war. How does the Terror War stack up to
these two recent experiences?
Policy and Strategy Match or Mismatch? In Vietnam, we never executed effective
strategies that could achieve our dual objectives of creating a strong South Viet-
nam and containing North Vietnam. In the Persian Gulf, our goal was sim-
ple—the liberation of Kuwait—and we formed a coalition and developed a
strategy to achieve it. Today, our purpose is to eliminate terrorists of global reach
and to deter their state sponsors. But we need effective strategies that will allow
us to find and destroy such organizations, stop other states from harboring
them, and encourage allied governments to support our essential and common
interests. It is no easy task.
Unlike in Vietnam or the Gulf, however, the threat is not far from our own
shores. We do not have the luxury of, nor would we be successful in pursuing, a
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purely defensive or “Fortress America” strategy. If we are to achieve our objectives
of ridding ourselves and the world of terrorism, we will have to stay on the
attack.
Suitability of Military Power. In Vietnam, the terrain and nature of the war
worked against our tactical and operational doctrine. In the Gulf, the terrain fa-
vored the use of American military power, and U.S. forces were supported and
assisted by nearby states. In Afghanistan, there is again support from the larger
world community for action, but we will need to develop a military strategy
based on airpower and small-unit operations, with only limited local support.
The sheer asymmetry of power between the United States and its enemies
means that any violence will have to be applied with an eye to ensuring a just
sense of proportionality. But we must also beware of appearing to be an ineffec-
tual giant, possessing an immense amount of force but stopping short of elimi-
nating foes—who then survive and grow more powerful, bolstered, perhaps one
day soon, by more formidable weapons of mass destruction.
Coalitions. In Vietnam, our major allies viewed the war with feelings ranging
from shared commitment (in the case of Australia and the Republic of Korea) to
profound misgiving. North Vietnam, by comparison, continued to receive vital
backing from the Soviet Union and China. In the Gulf, our coalition was so
broad—including our major allies and the leading regional powers—that Iraq
was almost completely isolated. In the war on terror, the great and varied sweep
of our operations will require us to maintain a worldwide coalition. Initial signs
of the world’s support have been encouraging, but we must consider ways of
conducting this ongoing war even in the face of increased skepticism or
opposition from other nations.
Our own coalitional challenge is undeniable, but at the same time it is impor-
tant to remember that our enemies too are part of a large and unstable coalition.
Our strategy must look to weaken that coalition.
Prewar Plans and Wartime Realities. In Vietnam, our prewar plans—based on a
concept of unlimited war against North Vietnam and, if necessary, China—could
not be realized, given the Cold War political situation that existed at the time. In
the Gulf War, even though we had time to study our enemy and the theater, and
though we executed our operational plans well, the end state was not very satis-
fying. In planning for contingencies during the Terror War, we must take into ac-
count what has changed and understand that much is still changing; this war
promises to be a highly fluid and dramatic one. Still, we must bear in mind that
the challenges we faced around the world before 11 September have not
evaporated. Many national interests and military realities remain the same. As
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we plan for the future we should not ignore sensible plans that have been crafted
to deal with other ongoing and imminent concerns.
The attacks of 11 September have not somehow eliminated other threats to
our security and to that of our friends and allies. For instance, in Asia the scale of
terrorism in the new century should make it plain that the threat of ballistic mis-
sile technology is no longer an academic matter. We should expect enemies who
have ballistic missiles to be more willing to use them.
Social Dimensions of Strategy. In Vietnam, a lengthy and inconclusive war
aroused unprecedented opposition and dissent within American society. In the
Gulf, the American people rewarded clear goals and a successful strategy with al-
most unqualified support. Today the nation is united behind the efforts of its
government far more than in Vietnam or even the Gulf. As the war against terror
becomes longer and its campaigns more numerous, however, the continuance of
that support will depend on tangible results, both at home and overseas.
This is all the more troublesome because there is now a genuine sense of per-
sonal risk among ordinary Americans; they understandably wish to see progress
against an enemy who has struck a very personal blow against them and their
families.
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 7
GOING TO WAR IN AMERICA
Recently, the Congress of the United States voted overwhelmingly to authorize
the use of force in the Terror War. Congress passed the Patriot Act in the Senate
98–1, and in the House 357–66. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373
confirmed an unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks. The UN General
Assembly agreed, in Resolution 56/1.
Nato took immediate steps for the invocation of article 5 of the Washington
Treaty. This article states that an armed attack against one or more of the allies in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. Finally,
the European Union issued a statement in which it declared that the United States
“and the EU would work in partnership to combat the evil of terrorism.” This de-
gree of support is unprecedented.
Let us go back thirty-seven years. Congress authorized U.S. intervention in
Vietnam by the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. This was passed in the Senate by a vote of
88–2 and in the House 416–0, votes even more overwhelming than the recent
ones. The United States took its case to the United Nations, but after much talk,
no action was taken in support of the United States, mostly due to the opposition
of the Soviet Union.
Prior to the start of offensive operations in the Gulf War, the joint resolution of
Congress authorizing use of force to oust Iraq from Kuwait passed 250–183 in the
House of Representatives and only squeaked by (52–47) in the Senate—the small-
est margins by which Congress ever voted for war. DESERT STORM, however, was
backed by a unanimous UN Security Council Resolution (678) authorizing military
force.
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War Termination and Postwar Settlements. In Vietnam, we consistently refused
to scale back our objectives despite evident lack of success, paving the way for an
eventual and complete defeat. In the Gulf, we rapidly terminated the war on the
basis of our original, limited objectives. The American government and the in-
ternational community are already addressing the difficult problem of how best
to govern postwar Afghanistan. But restoring Afghanistan will be only one part
of restructuring international life in the Terror War. It is difficult to say with any
confidence what the world, once rid of the threat of large-scale terrorist vio-
lence, will look like, but it is a question we must keep in mind as we move
forward.
One thing is certain—with each successive piece of the terror network that we
destroy, we run the risk of great instability in the Middle East and South Asia. On
one hand, the eventual return to peace must reflect the achievement of our im-
mediate goal of destroying the terrorist infrastructure. On the other, we must
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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS GUIDANCE
FOR THE TERROR WAR
To All Commanders, Commanding Officers, and Officers in Charge,
19 September 2001
Mission Comes First. Together with our sister services, other government agencies,
and allies and friends around the world, we will employ our capabilities where they
will be most needed, when they will be most effective. The mobility and agility of na-
val power will be called upon to hunt transnational terrorists. Be prepared to act
swiftly and accurately.
Wartime Footing. The president has stated we are at war with terrorism. We leaders
must draw upon our manpower and current readiness to accomplish that mission.
Thanks to your collective efforts, manpower levels in the fleet are better than they
have been in years. That remarkable achievement occurred because we made it a pri-
ority. We are winning the battle to retain the right people and fight attrition. Current
readiness is also solid, and resources coming from Congress in [fiscal year 2002] will
be the best we’ve seen in over a decade. My guidance here is simple: draw upon
these strengths to be ready!
The war against terrorism will not be short or easy. It will involve all commands,
ashore and afloat. Each of us is now on the front lines. Enhanced force-protection
measures are here to stay. We must all learn to implement higher and more stringent
measures in an effective way: be part of the solution. We must also ensure that all our
people, including our families, know what is expected of them.
Our nation will call upon the full might of the active and reserve force, acting to-
gether. In addition to providing fleet augmentation, naval reserves have many invalu-
able skills not resident in the active forces. We will be relying on these skills in the
months ahead.
Total unity of effort is needed to combat global terrorism. All Americans will serve
together in this struggle, including our shipmates of Arabic descent and of the Is-
lamic faith. Loyalty to fellow citizens must be stronger than the suspicion that our en-
emies wish to instill.
ADMIRAL VERN CLARK, U.S. NAVY, Chief of Naval Operations
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look to the situation that will arise in the wake of a series of campaigns against
terror groups and their state sponsors, and ensure that we do not proliferate
long-term threats by the way in which we resolve near-term problems.
Civil-Military Relations. In Vietnam, our civilian and military leaders never re-
solved the basic contradiction in their respective approaches to the war—that is,
of pursuing a limited war with immense military means. In the Gulf, there was a
conscious and generally more successful attempt by military and political lead-
ers to ensure a greater harmony between military strategy and policy goals. The
Terror War, with its promise of a series of campaigns in various parts of the
world, demands especially close civil and military coordination. Civilian leaders
will have to be kept cognizant of what the armed forces are, and are not, capable
of doing; senior military commanders will have to strive to ensure that proposed
strategies are accurately directed at the achievement of the government’s politi-
cal objectives. Both communities will have to strive to make sure that these is-
sues are properly understood by the American public.
The added challenge in the Terror War is secrecy. In Vietnam and the Gulf,
operational plans were kept secret; now entire operations must be conducted
without informing the public. This will require a new level of trust between the
government, the people, and the military; each will be required to make deci-
sions and evaluate results in an environment where information is, by design,
limited.
RODNEY P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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